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Enlisting the Tax Bar
DAVID M. SCHIZER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tax shelters have proliferated in the United States not only because
of financial innovation, the globalization of capital markets, the in-
creasing complexity of our tax system, the inadequacy of tax penalties,
the lack of political support for tax reform, and the growing popularity
of textualist interpretation-all factors that have attracted considera-
ble attention in the literature.' Shelters also derive from a structural
imbalance in our tax system that has not been adequately explored:
In important respects, the private tax bar outmatches its counterpart
in government. This imbalance is one of sheer numbers, of access to
information, and, at least in some cases, of sophistication and exper-
tise. The problem is evident not only in the low audit rate, 2 a familiar
issue, but also in the way the government staffs drafting projects and
litigation. Unfortunately, this mismatch helps breed the familiar eq-
uity and efficiency concerns associated with aggressive planning.3
Even though a strong case can be made for remedying this mis-
match, this Article emphasizes two institutional barriers that compli-
cate any solution, which are rooted in the political economy of
taxation and the economics and professional norms of the legal pro-
fession. First, although a dramatic increase in the staffing levels and
pay of government tax administrators would be good policy, this is a
politically daunting step. The level of pay necessary to be competitive
* Dean and the Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Helpful
comments were received from Marvin Chirelstein, Michael Doran, David Hariton,
Mitchell Kane, Edward Kleinbard, Donald Korb, David Miller, Alex Raskolnikov, Chuck
Sabel, Michael Schler, Bill Simon, Alvin Warren, Diana Wolman, Mark Yecies, and Larry
Zelenak.
1 The literature on tax shelters is massive. Joe Bankman wrote an important early piece
on the subject. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax
Notes 1775 (June 21, 1999). Volume 54 of the SMU Law Review and Volume 55 of the Tax
Law Review each contain interesting symposia on the subject. Symposium: Business Pur-
pose, Economic Substance and Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 S.M.U. L. Rev. 3 (2001); Sym-
posium on Corporate Tax Shelters: Part I, 55 Tax L. Rev. 125 (2002); Symposium on
Corporate Tax Shelters: Part II, 55 Tax L. Rev. 289 (2002).
2 See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Corporate Risk of a Tax Audit Is Still Shrinking, I.R.S.
Data Show, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2004, at C1 (audit rate for firms with over $ 250 million in
assets fell from 33.7% in 2002 to 29% in 2003).
3 For a discussion of these equity and efficiency problems, see David M. Schizer, Fric-
tions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312 (2001).
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with top private lawyers sounds utterly outlandish to the typical voter,
since current government salaries (which are 90% less than what top
lawyers earn) are already multiples of the median household income.4
Given the unpopularity of the IRS, moreover, underfunded tax ad-
ministration has an almost irresistible political advantage. It is an
under-the-radar tax cut-appreciated by those who benefit from it-
that purports not to be a tax cut at all, but rather an effort to cut "fat"
from an unpopular federal bureaucracy.
Since dramatic infusions of resources for tax enforcement are un-
likely, a fallback strategy is to look to the private bar, enlisting its help
in combating aggressive tax planning. This brings us to the second
institutional source of the mismatch between the government and pri-
vate bar: the conflict faced by the private bar. Both market pressure
and professional norms motivate members of the bar to serve their
clients, who generally do not have an interest in improving govern-
ment tax enforcement. As a result, appeals to the bar's conscience 5 or
its commitment to professionalism 6 will be of only limited use.
In light of these twin challenges-the political difficulties of increas-
ing funding and salaries and the structural difficulty of relying on pri-
vate lawyers-what can be done to mitigate the mismatch between
the government and private bar? Although there are no perfect solu-
tions, this Article offers two sets of proposals. The first group focuses
on the government, and offers ways to upgrade the government's ex-
4 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Employment Statistics
(2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes231011.htm (estimating annual mean
wage for federal government lawyers as $112,210); U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty,
and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2005, at 5 (Aug. 2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income-weath/007419.htm]
(reporting that median household income in the United States was $46,242 in 2005); New
York Firms Lead the Pack, Am. Law., May 2006, at 179, 179 (one-third of the Am Law 100
Firms report average annual partner compensation of more than $1 million).
5 Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 Va. Tax Rev. 43 (2001). Because Lavoie believes that "[m]any
lawyers involved in corporate tax-shelter activity are deeply troubled by the role they
play," he says they will help combat shelters if the government, in effect, gives them an
excuse to do so. Id. at 46. They need a reason to raise the inadvisability of shelters with
clients, and, armed with the right mandates or doctrines (for example, a duty to verify the
facts recited in a tax opinion), they will do so. In addition, Lavoie suggests "[i]mpressing
practitioners with a sense of obligation to uphold the tax laws" through education, includ-
ing in law school. Id. at 89. Although I agree that many tax lawyers find shelters to be
objectionable, and that it is valuable to encourage lawyers to feel a personal obligation to
protect the tax system, the focus of my analysis is less on appeals to conscience, and more
on appeals to self interest.
6 Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter In-
dustry, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 77 (2006). Rostain emphasizes the ways in which the ABA and
NYSBA Tax Sections have supported government efforts to rein in tax shelters. Yet she
does not focus on the merits of various anti-tax-shelter measures, but on the role of bar
associations in this process and the associated lessons to be learned about professionalism.
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pertise without dramatically increasing funding or raising pay across
the board. For example, the government should focus on recruiting
senior lawyers out of retirement (whose financial demands will be lim-
ited) and having them mentor junior lawyers directly from law school
(where private sector pay would be high, but not nearly as high as it
will become in later years). The government ought to consider a loan
forgiveness program for these recent graduates. In addition, the gov-
ernment should enlist academics to assist with discrete projects, and
should retain private law firms to litigate tax controversies with ex-
traordinary precedential value. This Article considers and rejects a
more radical proposal for the government to rely on private attorneys
general to aid in tax collection.
Second, this Article offers guidance about the right way (and the
wrong way) to tap the expertise and information possessed by the pri-
vate bar. It is more effective, whenever possible, to ask lawyers to
help the government in a way that also helps their clients. Although
this principle is straightforward, even obvious, it has not been in-
voked, at least as far as I know, to determine which functions the pri-
vate bar can usefully perform in this context. Employing this
principle, this Article identifies promising opportunities that have
been overlooked, and critiques unpromising initiatives that have at-
tracted significant government support. For example, clients do not
want their own tax deals shut down, but they feel differently about
their competitor's deals, so the government should make more sys-
tematic use of this opportunity. Likewise, although clients are less
motivated to help the government identify bad transactions that are
inadvertently permitted, they are highly motivated to identify good
transactions that are inadvertently prohibited. As a result, the gov-
ernment can look to the private bar for help in narrowing overbroad
anti-abuse measures. On the other hand, in asking tax advisors to dis-
close their clients' aggressive transactions-in effect, to "rat" on their
clients-the government is asking for something that clearly is not in
their clients' interest. This reality is likely to undercut this initiative,
which has been one of the centerpieces of the government's efforts to
date.
The next Part of this Article elaborates on the mismatch between
the government and the private bar, explaining why the problem is so
entrenched. Part III considers ways to hire better government law-
yers, both for full-time responsibilities and for discrete projects. Parts
IV and V focus on how to tap the expertise of private lawyers without
hiring them directly. Part IV explores initiatives in which the interests
of the government and the client are aligned, at least to an extent, so
that the bar faces less of a conflict in assisting the government. In
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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contrast, Part V explores initiatives in which the interests of the gov-
ernment and client are in conflict. These initiatives can succeed only if
the government can detach lawyers from their clients' interests with
sufficiently powerful carrots or sticks. This is possible in some cases,
but it is never easy. Part VI is the conclusion.
II. THE ENTRENCHED MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE BAR
There is an old story about someone who loves Beethoven and is
invited by his brother to hear a performance of the Ninth Symphony.
Soon after agreeing enthusiastically, he is disappointed to learn that
the symphony will be performed by his niece's middle school
orchestra.
The point here, obviously, is that a symphony is beautiful only if
played properly. Likewise, a set of tax rules will have their intended
effect only if administered properly. The U.S. tax law is filled with
complex rules that aspire to capture economic nuance. Yet these rules
can be effective only if they can be implemented, not by some ideal-
ized tax administrator, but by the flesh-and-blood administrators we
have. In short, the quality of the people who draft rules, audit returns,
and litigate controversies is profoundly important to the integrity of
our system.
This Part argues that there is a mismatch in expertise and numbers
between the government administrators who seek to collect tax from
sophisticated taxpayers and the private lawyers who represent these
high-net-worth individuals and large corporations. 7 This Part then of-
fers a theory about why this mismatch is difficult to correct, grounded
both in political economy and in the economics and professional
norms of the legal profession.
A. The Mismatch
The aggressive tax planning of sophisticated taxpayers relies on
three familiar failures of government tax administration. Although a
broad phenomenon within our tax system, these failures are easiest to
see with tax shelters-transactions that rely on a strained reading of
the relevant tax provision to claim inflated deductions, to avoid in-
cluding otherwise taxable income, and the like.
First, shelters (and, indeed, all aggressive planning) exploit poorly
drafted statutes and regulations. The relevant rules are capable of be-
7 The balance is different for the average taxpayer, but that aspect of our tax system is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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ing read (albeit aggressively) to allow, for example, tax losses with no
corresponding economic losses. Drafters need to be more effective in
anticipating this sort of misreading. This task is especially important,
and especially difficult, when judges focus on the text, instead of on
congressional purpose, and construe ambiguities against the govern-
ment. Textualist judges cannot be counted on to ask, "Why would
Congress allow such a generous result?" Instead, they consider it the
job of Congress or Treasury, not the courts, to shut down abusive
transactions. Meanwhile, the practice in Congress and Treasury is to
act prospectively, grandfathering early deals. 8 This means that draft-
ers cannot afford to make mistakes; but, unfortunately, they often do.
It is extremely difficult, even for an experienced drafter who has am-
ple time, to anticipate all relevant contingencies. This is all the more
true when language is cobbled together in the middle of the night-as
is often the case-by drafters who do not have deep experience prac-
ticing in the relevant area.
Second, tax shelters obviously take advantage of poor auditing.
Even if the taxpayer's argument on the merits is weak, the tax will
never be paid if the transaction is not challenged on audit. Both the
low percentage of high income returns that are audited, as well as the
unsophistication of some auditors and their auditing techniques have
encouraged taxpayers to play this "audit lottery." 9 Indeed, tax shel-
ters often have extraneous pieces that are included solely to befuddle
auditors.10 Facing a large and complicated return, auditors try to in-
tuit what questions to ask, without really knowing where the bodies
are buried. A civil servant's nine-to-five mentality further undercuts
the work of some auditors. "The key to a successful audit [from the
taxpayer's perspective]," the tax director of a large multinational once
told me, "is to give the auditor an office near the elevator. This way,
the auditor will feel comfortable going home early, since he won't
have to pass anyone else's office on the way out."1 "
Third, even if the auditor discovers the aggressive transaction, the
government litigators who pursue the matter usually are more leanly
staffed and less experienced than taxpayer's counsel. Although the
government has enjoyed some successes of late, the reality is that it
must settle most of its cases and, when it litigates, it sometimes offers
8 See, e.g., IRC § 338(h), which ended doubling of losses related to contingent liabilities,
but applied prospectively.
9 See generally Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deter-
rence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 576-77, 583-84, 587-94
(2006).
10 See id. at 587-89.
1 This conversation took place in 1997, and the tax director in question would prefer
not to be named.
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concessions that it should not offer 12 and at times loses cases that it
should win. 13 These lost cases have a troubling ripple effect, serving
as precedent that aggressive taxpayers in turn use to justify other ag-
gressive transactions. This prospect of adverse precedent is all the
more reason for the government to avoid risky litigation, a reality that
is not lost on aggressive taxpayers. They know that, even if their
transaction is identified on audit, they have a good chance to settle on
favorable terms (for example, no penalties) or, if necessary, to litigate
with some prospect of success. 14 So why not roll the dice?
The mismatches in each of the three phases described above-in
drafting rules, in auditing returns, and in litigating cases-all arise, to
a significant degree, from a common source: the limited resources al-
located to tax administration. This underfunding itself has three man-
ifestations. First, the government is chronically understaffed. At the
drafting stage, there are simply not enough people to plug holes that
constantly are being detected in the tax law, let alone to think proac-
tively about how to improve the system. Statutory gaps and ambigui-
ties endure for years, while only a few technical corrections are
enacted every session. 15 Likewise, Treasury often takes years to issue
draft regulations on an issue, and then still more time to finalize them.
There are simply not enough people to do this work. The same is true
for auditors, who must comb through piles of documents in a treasure
hunt for inappropriate items. It is not unusual for one or two auditors
to sit in a room with two or three times as many representatives for
the taxpayer. This pattern repeats in litigation, where a young Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney, who is devoting a small fraction of her time to a
case and often has only limited tax experience, opposes a team of sea-
soned tax lawyers for the taxpayer.16
The second manifestation of tight budgets is that government tax
administrators are not of uniformly high quality or deep experience.
12 For instance, in the Compaq case, the government stipulated to the fact that the tax-
payer owned the relevant stock, thereby giving up a promising argument that could have
won the case. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and
the Compaq Case, 88 Tax Notes 221, 223 (July 10, 2000).
13 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001);
IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); UPS, Inc. v. Commissioner,
254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
14 See generally Bankman, note 1.
15 In addition to lean staffing, political considerations contribute to this problem, includ-
ing the fact that a loophole-closing provision can be tarred as a "tax increase." Another
problem with technical corrections is that interest groups sometimes view them as a wedge
to revisit substantive provisions, sucking up more staff time and possibly leading to new
potential loopholes.
16 While refund litigation is conducted by the Justice Department, Tax Court litigation is
staffed by the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, whose attorneys sometimes have more substan-
tive tax expertise.
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Many are relatively new to the profession, signing up for government
service as a way to jumpstart their careers. The elephant in the room
is the enormous pay differential between government and the private
sector. A junior IRS lawyer will earn half what a junior lawyer at a
firm makes, and the gap grows significantly wider as a lawyer becomes
more senior, so that senior government officials earn less than 10% of
what some senior private attorneys earn. 17 The government offers
offsetting advantages, of course, such as work that is extremely inter-
esting, the power to shape the tax system, the satisfaction of serving
the country, and, as noted above, the chance to build a professional
reputation quickly. The reality is, though, that many of the govern-
ment's best people stay only a few years, leaving ultimately for more
lucrative private sector responsibilities. In addition, many of the na-
tion's best tax lawyers never serve in government at all.
In addition to being understaffed and underpaid, the government is
at a third disadvantage, relative to the private bar, which is as much
structural as financial: It suffers from an imbalance in information. In
a self-reporting system, the initiative lies with taxpayers. They have
the freedom to structure their affairs, inevitably choosing the tax-effi-
cient course. 18 They have the further advantage of controlling the
flow of information to the government, offering only what the govern-
ment requests (and, even then, typically construing the government's
request in a self-interested way). Without a significant investment in
gathering information, the government may have to wait years before
discovering a new tax-planning technique. There is also the risk that,
by the time it does discover the technique, it will feel constrained not
to challenge it, given the heavy volume of transactions that already
have taken advantage of it, and the political clout behind those
transactions. 19
Readers who are not tax experts may wonder whether the mismatch
described here is unique to tax administration. Is there a parallel mis-
match between SEC lawyers and the securities bar that represents
large public companies, or between prosecutors and elite white collar
lawyers, or between EPA lawyers and the elite environmental bar?
Although the question is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth a
brief comment. I suspect that such a mismatch does exist in other
17 See note 4.
18 In other work, I have referred to this phenomenon as the taxpayer's "planning op-
tion." See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive
Tax Planning, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1344 (2000).
19 See Heather Bennett, Parker Debunks "Wall Street Rule," Pushes LTR Preconfer-
ences, 2003 TNT 184-4, Sep. 22, 2003, available in LEXIS, TNT File (using the phrase
"Wall Street Rule" to describe the idea that a deal that has become sufficiently common is
politically difficult to challenge).
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areas of law, but that the tax mismatch may be especially significant
for three reasons. First, government tax lawyers are not backstopped
by private attorneys general as they are, for instance, in the securities
field by the plaintiff's bar. Second, tax rules generally are written nar-
rowly and precisely-unlike some criminal statutes, for instance,
which cover more conduct than is really culpable and leave it to
prosecutorial discretion to determine who is prosecuted. As a result,
the tax authorities are more likely to face conduct that violates the
spirit, but not the letter, of the regime, and thus the lawyering chal-
lenge of using not-quite-on-point rules to stop it.20 Third, the tax re-
gime-for capital, especially-may be more malleable than other
regimes, such that good lawyering (and, correspondingly, mismatches
in lawyering between the government and private bar) are particularly
significant. In other regimes, unalterable physical realities often back-
stop legal distinctions, so that there is only so much a lawyer can do to
change the result. Even if one country's environmental laws are more
favorable than another, a lawyer cannot move a factory from one ju-
risdiction to another. But a tax lawyer can easily shift certain types of
income from one jurisdiction to another without changing anything
substantive; for example, does it matter which corporate entity-the
Delaware subsidiary or the Cayman Islands subsidiary-holds the busi-
ness's intangibles? Likewise, if environmental laws treat cars and
trucks differently, there is only so much a lawyer can do to classify a
car as a truck. Yet a tax lawyer would not say the same thing about
the debt-equity distinction. In the taxation of capital especially, fric-
tions are weak, so that the quality of lawyering alone makes an enor-
mous difference.
B. Why the Mismatch Is So Entrenched
Since the mismatch between government and private lawyers is an
important cause of aggressive tax planning, it would be eminently sen-
sible to correct the mismatch. The government could raise revenue
more fairly and efficiently. Aggressive taxpayers would lose their
edge over conservative ones and also would see less advantage to in-
vesting time and resources in tax planning. Indeed, with better draft-
ing and enforcement, the government could cut rates without losing
revenue. Thus, although additional government expenditures on tax
administration are thought to be a form of social waste, they foreclose
another form of waste-private expenditures on tax planning. As long
20 Of course, some tax rules are deliberately written broadly, including § 269 and the
partnership anti-abuse rule, Reg. 1.701-2, but the very imprecision of these broad rules
sometimes causes taxpayers to discount them.
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as spending another dollar on administration reduces at least a dollar
of planning waste, the expenditure is socially worthwhile. 21 For exam-
ple, if the government invests in writing a well-crafted regulation to
resolve an ambiguity in the law, this up-front expenditure saves the
tax bar countless hours of analysis about how to handle the ambiguity
and also heads off aggressive strategies that take advantage of it.22
Yet, although the advantages of better administration may seem ir-
resistible, they are consistently resisted. 23 This Section offers a theory
about why the mismatch between the government and private bar is
so deeply entrenched. In essence, there are two main paths away
from the status quo, but neither is easy. The first, involving greater
government expenditures on administration, is blocked by political
constraints, since overly-lean enforcement functions as a tax cut with
an almost irresistible political advantage: It can be presented not as a
tax cut at all, but as an effort to "wring the fat" from the unpopular
IRS bureaucracy. The second path away from the status quo, involv-
ing greater public responsibilities for private lawyers, is obstructed by
the professional norms and economics of the legal profession, since
private lawyers face a significant conflict in helping the government
combat aggressive planning. Although some progress on each dimen-
sion is possible, this is a daunting problem to tackle.
1. Politics: The Constraint on Enlisting the Government Bar
Before explaining the political obstacles to better tax administra-
tion, it is worth emphasizing that there are, of course, political factors
that counsel in favor of this goal. Making the tax system more effi-
cient and equitable is good policy, which obviously should have some
influence on political actors (although one has to be naive to think
such considerations are dispositive). For a political actor focused on
advancement, additional revenue is the mother's milk of a career,
since it can pay for profile-raising tax cuts or programs (but, of course,
only if the political actor is able to steer this revenue in her preferred
21 It is a fallacy to say that the government should spend up to a dollar on tax enforce-
ment to collect a dollar of revenue. The better test is to spend up to a dollar on tax en-
forcement to avoid a dollar of social waste from tax planning. For a discussion of this
point, and of the marginal efficiency cost of funds framework from which it derives, see
generally Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Effi-
ciency Cost of Funds, 43 Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Papers 172, 183-89 (1996).
22 Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557,
562-70 (1992).
23 See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Figures Show Drop in Tax Audits for Big Companies,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1999, at Al ("Congress ... cut I.R.S. spending sharply and required
the agency to devote more resources to customer service. Republicans characterized the
I.R.S. as an agency that was out of control and that was intruding far too deeply into the
lives of Americans.").
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tion slogan, especially when tax fraud is salient in the public mind.
For a number of reasons, however, it is politically difficult to intro-
duce substantial increases in the staffing or salaries of government tax
lawyers. For one thing, taxes on sophisticated taxpayers-or, at least,
taxes on investment returns-are controversial. Within the academy
and the body politic, a significant group believes that investment re-
turns should not be taxed (a position with which I have a great deal of
sympathy).2 4 Likewise, there are concerns that high marginal rates on
wages discourage economic growth.25 Although no one would defend
poor enforcement as a first-best method of reducing taxes (since rate
cuts are always more efficient and equitable), some might opt for poor
enforcement as a second-best means of cutting a tax that cannot be
cut more directly.
Indeed, hidden tax cuts are a deeply entrenched feature of our po-
litical life. For example, the difference between an effective loophole-
closing measure and an ineffective one tends to be quite technical, so
that the general public and the media often cannot discern the differ-
ence. Indeed, only a small cohort of trained experts can truly tell
whether the shelter is being shut down, and these experts have devel-
oped their expertise in the service of taxpayers-often, the very taxpay-
ers who have been using the shelter. Given how hard it is for the
public to monitor these technical issues, it is tempting for self-inter-
ested political actors to propose half-measures that are not fully effec-
tive. These partial responses offer their sponsors the best of both
political worlds, allowing them to score points with the general public
for "shutting down" the shelter while, ironically, also scoring points
with the affected taxpayers for doing so "in a reasonable way" that
leaves them other deals to do. 26 Similarly, passing rules that seem to
respond to tax planning, while providing insufficient funding for the
effective administration of these rules, allows political actors to claim
credit with voters without actually impeding, and thus offending, ag-
gressive taxpayers.2 7
24 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Con-
sumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 1455 (2006).
25 See, e.g., Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 76-77 (5th ed. 1987); Richard
Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal
Equity, 1984 Duke L.J. 509, 536-37 (1984) (discussing economic inefficiencies caused by
high marginal tax rates).
26 For a discussion of this dynamic, see Schizer, note 3, at 1322-23.
27 In light of this interest-group dynamic, as well as the broader political opposition to
taxing capital, it is fair to wonder how significant the staffing issues emphasized in this
Article really turn out to be. If political factors prevent a vigorous government response to
shelters, then the question of how many government lawyers work on these issues and how
much experience they have becomes less important. An extreme version of this claim is
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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While the general public's support for taxes is unenthusiastic at
best, voters regard tax enforcement and administration with even
more ambivalence.2 8 No one sails to reelection on the platform,
"more money for the IRS!" Indeed, consider what would happen if
the Washington Post began publishing stories about the millions spent
on hiring elite tax lawyers, while lunch money for public school chil-
dren was being cut. The reaction of members of Congress (of either
party) is easy to predict. Needless to say, U.S. voters have little affec-
tion for the IRS. Perhaps there is an element of national mythology at
work here. The tax collector is unlikely to be a hero in a nation
founded in a rebellion against British taxes. The rhetoric of limited
government and individual initiative is pervasive in U.S. public life.
This anti-tax-collector feeling certainly is reinforced by the bad experi-
ence almost everyone has had, at some point, with the lower level
bureaucracy of the IRS. Obviously, there is a political constituency
that wants to stoke this anti-IRS feeling: high income taxpayers who
benefit from lax enforcement. As noted above, providing insufficient
funding for tax administration is a way to cut taxes that can be
presented, not as a tax cut, but as a "good government" initiative to
trim "waste" from an unpopular federal bureaucracy. The congres-
sional hearings on IRS misconduct in the late 1990's showed quite
clearly that tax administration is an easy political target. 29
Raising the salary of government tax lawyers, so that pay is more
competitive with the seven-figure salaries earned by top private law-
yers, is an especially hard sell. The essential problem is that these
private lawyers earn so much more than the median household in-
come, which as of 2005 is just over $46,000.30 A salary three times this
level for senior government lawyers seems quite high to the median
voter, but it is only a small fraction of what a top lawyer earn in pri-
that, even if the government were populated only by the leading lights of the profession,
nothing would change because the political leadership would stop them from doing any-
thing meaningful. A corollary is that top-notch people will refuse to serve if they are con-
strained in this way, since the job will not be sufficiently interesting. But in this extreme
form, the claim is unpersuasive. A more balanced assessment is that the political winds
tend to shift. Tax administration may attract either moderate or weak support-in the
general public, in Congress, and in the executive branch-depending upon which party is
in power, whether a booming economy is already filling the government's coffers, whether
a war or other large scale initiative requires extra revenue, and the like. These fluctuating
factors filter down to the tax enforcement bureaucracy, determining whether the political
appointees who manage the process will flog their staff to react forcefully or restrain them
from doing so. In this sort of cyclical environment, the capacity of the staff to respond
effectively-a function of their quality and numbers-obviously remains quite important.
28 See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal 145-56 (2003).
29 Internal Revenue Service Mismanagement and Ideas for Improvement, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Government Management, Information, and Technology of the
H. Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. (1997).
30 See note 4.
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vate practice.31 Likewise, it is difficult to raise the salary of govern-
ment tax lawyers, without also raising the salary of other government
experts who also are underpaid. To pose the most extreme case,
should leading tax administrators really earn as much as (or more
than) the President?32
This is not to say that government enforcement cannot be improved
at all. The case on the merits is powerful, as is public opposition to tax
fraud, as well as the incentives of public actors to raise revenue. The
point is that significant political constraints limit what can be done,
requiring incrementalism, careful thought, and compromise. In light
of these limits, it is also worth considering whether private lawyers can
be induced to supplement these efforts. Put another way, the mis-
match between the government and the private bar is likely to endure,
at least to a degree. The question, then, is whether the government
somehow can make use of the private bar's expertise without hiring
them directly.
2. Conflicts: The Constraint on Enlisting the Private Bar
In other words, can the private tax bar be enlisted to help the gov-
ernment? For example, can private lawyers be interrogated to dis-
cover where the loopholes are in particular rules? The reality is that it
is quite difficult to force the private bar to do what it does not want to
do.
At a minimum, there is a significant political problem. The opposi-
tion of bar associations, for instance, can be a formidable political hur-
dle. 33 This is not to say that it is insurmountable. Particularly in times
of crisis, when the public eye is focused on a problem, additional man-
dates sometimes can be crammed down the throats of professional
advisors. This is something securities lawyers have seen recently in
Sarbanes Oxley34 and, to an extent, tax lawyers have seen as well in
31 Id.
32 The President currently earns a salary of $400,000. 3 U.S.C.A. 102 (2004).
33 As Rostain notes, the NYSBA and ABA supported some recent anti-shelter initia-
tives. See Rostain, note 6, at 97-104. But it is worth emphasizing that the NYSBA and
ABA did not support all of the initiatives, and they supported some only on the condition
that they be modified. For example, the organized bar opposed codifying the economic
substance doctrine and, not surprisingly, this provision was not enacted. NYSBA Objects
to Codification of Economic Substance Provisions, 2003 TNT 102-19, May 28, 2003, availa-
ble in LEXIS, TNT File.
34 See Jonathan D. Glater, A Legal Uproar Over Proposals to Regulate the Profession,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2002, at C1 (discussing resistance among legal professionals to the
SEC's proposed rules on standards of conduct in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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the government response to tax shelters.35 But in ordinary political
conditions, the general public remains blissfully ignorant of the details
of a technical regime such as the tax law, and experts represent one of
the key constituencies that understand, and actually focus on, this
body of rules. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to force ex-
perts to discharge a responsibility they do not want.
Even if the political will can be mustered, there is the further prob-
lem of ensuring compliance. Will the private bar actually do what
they have been asked to do? At first blush, this is a surprising prob-
lem to raise. After all, lawyers are as likely as anyone to obey the
law-more so, really. But the point here is that there is a difference
between actually complying-in the sense of truly giving the govern-
ment the help it is seeking-and merely going through the motions.
Indeed, tax lawyers are a creative bunch, and they know how to avoid
providing help, while seeming to do what is asked of them. Needless
to say, you can count on tax lawyers to find ambiguity in almost any
government instruction. Of course, if the government had perfect in-
formation and ample staff to monitor whether lawyers were comply-
ing with these directives, then lawyers presumably would comply
more faithfully. But obviously that is not the case. Indeed, the very
reason private lawyers are being asked to help is that government ca-
pabilities are limited.
The broader point, then, is that if the tax bar does not want to help,
they will find ways to avoid helping. This raises an essential question:
When, if ever, will the tax bar be willing to help? Does it ever have
the incentive to assist the government? I believe the answer is "yes"
only in certain special circumstances, which the government should
exploit to the fullest. But before turning to these exceptional circum-
stances, I begin with the general answer, which is a resounding "no."
Most of the time, private lawyers cannot be counted on to help the
government for two self-evident reasons.
First, and most importantly, lawyers are eternally mindful of who
pays their bills. They worry about keeping their clients, and about
attracting new ones. Clients obviously want to pay as little tax as pos-
sible. They certainly do not want their paid advisors to help the gov-
ernment raise their tax bills. A tax lawyer who is known to help the
government collect more tax from his client is unlikely to remain a tax
lawyer for long. More generally, lawyers are looking to advance the
interests of their clients, and, ordinarily, a client's interests are adverse
to those of the government.
35 See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Unit Will Focus on Lawyers and Accountants, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 2003, at C2 (discussing the Service's use of Circular 230 to increase policing
of lawyers who promote abusive tax shelters).
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Professional norms supply a second reason why lawyers will be re-
luctant to help the government. In our adversarial system, lawyers
generally owe duties to their own client, but not to the other side. In
tax planning, the other side is the government, and even when a law-
yer is giving advice about planning, she focuses on what would happen
if the matter is litigated. Will the client's strategy succeed if tested in
court? How can the client's position be strengthened? To a tax advi-
sor who is thinking through these issues, the government is, quite
frankly, the enemy. The client, meanwhile, looms very large in the
lawyer's professional obligations. Stirring rhetoric is often used to de-
scribe the attorney-client relationship-a "sacred trust," and the like.
The lawyer is supposed to advocate for a client's interest zealously
(within the bounds of the law, of course), and the lawyer is supposed
to keep a client's confidences. 36 The details of a client's transactions
are a client's property, and a lawyer generally should not disclose
them to anyone. Given these client-focused professional norms, it is
not a comfortable thing to provide help to the government. Although
a tax lawyer may owe a separate duty to the tax system-a point dis-
cussed below-her primary allegiance is to her client.
To reinforce this point, consider the contrast between tax shelters
and the corporate scandals of the last decade. At first blush, there are
obvious similarities. They each involve the manipulation of systems of
financial reporting (whether accounting or tax), usually through
strained readings of the relevant rule, paired with complex structures
designed to obscure economic reality. Yet a key difference is who is
being deceived. It is shareholders in the case of corporate scandals
versus the tax authorities in the case of shelters. In the corporate con-
text, it is a matter of concern that multiple layers of gatekeepers failed
to protect shareholders, including research analysts and boards of di-
rectors.37 Yet at least there are multiple layers of gatekeepers in the
corporate context; there are no such private gatekeepers for the tax
system. For example, a research analyst would never think she was
obligated to notify the Service upon discovering that a company is
using tax shelters.
So far, in assessing the difficulty of arranging collaborations be-
tween the bar and the government, I have emphasized problems with
the bar's incentives. But it is also worth observing a problem on the
government's side. If the government does not have to pay for the
bar's time, the government is less likely to use this time efficiently.
The government may be tempted to assign the bar time-consuming
36 See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt., 1.6 (1983).
37 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 16
(2006).
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tasks that are not cost-justified. As with any unfunded mandate, the
costs do not fall on the government. The point should not be over-
stated, since there are political costs in wasting the bar's time. But, as
discussed below,38 there is a regrettable element of make-work in
some of the initiatives the government has proposed.
To sum up, then, it is difficult for the government to enlist the tax
bar's help, given the bar's incentives and, to a degree, the govern-
ment's as well. But the operative word is "difficult," not "impossible."
Careful thought is required, and there obviously are some things that
do not work, but there also are some that do.
Part III considers various ways the government can hire private
lawyers directly, consistent with the political constraints described
above. Parts IV and V discuss a range of ways the government can
tap into the expertise of private lawyers without hiring them, while at
the same time taking account of, and hopefully mitigating, the conflict
discussed above.
III. ENLISTING GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
To sum up the argument so far, the government does not have
enough people working on tax administration, and the people it has
are not all up to the task. There are also political constraints on what
can be done about this problem. This Part considers a range of ways
to enhance the capabilities of government enforcement, including
strategies for recruiting top talent for full-time positions and new
sources of expertise who could be retained for discrete projects.
These government-focused strategies have the important advantage
of (largely) avoiding the conflict that arises when the private bar's as-
sistance is sought. Yet in steering clear of the Scylla of conflicts, they
veer closer to the Charibdis of political constraints, described above;
thus, the effort here is to focus on ideas that either work within the
government's pay scale or can be justified by politically plausible ra-
tionales. These ideas are meant to be doable-or at least not too
much of a stretch-in light of political constraints. The Part then con-
cludes by considering (and rejecting) a more radical step in which pri-
vate attorneys general would be enlisted to backstop government
enforcement.
38 See text accompanying notes 77-79.
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A. Full-Time Recruits
1. A "Great Place to Start"-and Finish
In recruiting top talent, the government should target people at
stages in their career in which the pay gap is least significant. An im-
portant category is recent law school graduates. Although the pay gap
is still sizable, it is substantially less than the gap becomes once these
graduates become partners at top firms (for example, a 50% pay cut
instead of a 90% pay Cut). 39 The government also can offer several
nonmonetary benefits that private practice does not offer. Because
government staffing is so lean, junior lawyers bear significant respon-
sibilities very quickly, developing invaluable skills and reputations.
Their hours are more manageable. They also have the satisfaction of
performing a valuable public service. Admittedly, the fact that these
young lawyers have a long career ahead of them-which is likely to
include service to private clients-may introduce some conflict issues,
as they may steer clear of offending potential employers; but this
traditional concern about "revolving doors" should not be overstated.
After all, potential clients should be more impressed by (and thus
more likely to hire) government lawyers who effectively advance the
interests of their client (that is, the government) than those who do
favors for the other side. To his credit, Donald Korb, the IRS Chief
Counsel, has recognized the government's comparative advantage
with younger lawyers, and has launched the "Great Place to Start"
initiative, designed to recruit them while they are in law school.40
Congress would be wise to complement this effort with a commit-
ment to repay the student loans of a select group of highly capable
graduates who enter government service. This is necessary because
tuition at top law schools is approximately $40,000 per year.41 When
room and board are added in, students are spending over $150,000 in
out-of-pocket costs on their legal education, much of which is financed
by debt.42 They also may have student loans from college. This real-
ity significantly undercuts the otherwise promising strategy of target-
ing recent law school graduates. Even though the pay gap is narrower
for recent graduates, their loans render them less able to afford any
39 See Robert Guy Matthews, It's Taxing to Recruit Top Law Grads to IRS, but a New
Push Betters Returns, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at B1 (reporting that entry level pay at the
Service is $65,000 or $70,000, which is almost half the starting salary at top private firms).
40 Id.; IRS Chief Counsel Korb Addresses May 2006 American Bar Association Section
of Taxation Meeting, U.S. Fed. News, May 5, 2006, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/
government/3661915-1.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
41 Law School Admission Council, Financial Aid for Law School: A Preliminary Guide
2 (2006), available at http://www.lsac.org/pdfs/2006-2007/FINAIDTEXTWEB06.pdf.
42 Id.
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gap at all.43 Congress could solve this problem by forgiving a fraction
of a student's loans for every year she works for the government (cou-
pled with a commitment from the student to work a minimum number
of years). For example, if a student could emerge debt-free after
working six years for Treasury, government service would become ex-
tremely attractive. Of course, this is functionally similar to a pay in-
crease, but structuring a raise in this way has political advantages. The
government is not committed to give this pay increase across the
board, since a principle can be offered to distinguish these needy jun-
ior lawyers from other employees. Also, a sympathetic story can be
told to voters about why this program is necessary-for tax lawyers, to
be sure, and perhaps for other government experts as well.
While junior lawyers should be an important component of the gov-
ernment's hiring strategy, the government needs more senior lawyers
to mentor them. Another promising pool is made up of elite lawyers
retiring from law firm practice. The pay differential should be less
significant for this group, since they will have accumulated significant
savings; indeed, if they were prepared to accept no salary income as
retirees, they should be satisfied with the government's pay scale.
They may be motivated by a desire to give back to the tax system.
They also have deep experience. Since many firms are encouraging
lawyers to retire at sixty-five, there is a growing pool of experts look-
ing for an interesting challenge, and willing to work for another five
years or more. For this group, mentoring a team of young and highly
motivated junior lawyers could be quite an attractive proposition, and
could leverage their expertise without placing excessive demands on
their time. They could slow down from the demands of a top private
practice, while doing work that is interesting and meaningful.
2. "First Response" Team
While the focus above is on remaining (largely) within the govern-
ment's existing pay scale, there is much to be said for increasing the
pay scale significantly for a small cohort of top people. What if the
government hired two dozen partners from leading firms at market
rates-or, for that matter, even at half or a third of what they have
been earning in practice? Their expertise could be spread across the
43 See, e.g., id. at 7 (suggesting alternatives for law students who wish to take a public
interest position with average starting salary of $40,000 in 2005); Rhonda McMillion, A
Lighter Load, ABA J., Aug. 2005, at 64 (reporting an ABA study confirming that debt is
preventing law students from pursuing public service careers); Matthews, note 39 (quoting
several students applying for positions at the Service, yet expressing anxiety about their
debt).
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various regimes that are relevant to sophisticated taxpayers, including
financial products, international tax, partnerships, and corporate tax.
With this expertise, the government stands a better chance of win-
ning more precedent-setting litigation and of writing tighter regula-
tions. This group also could serve as a first-response team. As soon as
they learn of an aggressive transaction (for example, by reading one of
Lee Sheppard's columns, by receiving an anonymous tip, or by re-
viewing disclosure received from a taxpayer), they could invite the
taxpayer and their advisor to defend the transaction, and then make a
judgment about whether to take special action to shut the deal down
quickly (for example, through a notice issued immediately), or to al-
low the government to consider the deal through its usual (slower)
process. 4 4 They also could review draft regulations and statutes to
screen them for potential loopholes, and they could give advice to
government litigators about strategy.
Although this proposal involves a significant pay increase, it limits
the increase to a small number of government lawyers, so that the
budgetary impact is a rounding error within the tax enforcement
budget. The cost would easily be justified by increases in revenue and
significant reductions in the social waste from tax planning. Admit-
tedly, there is the problem of inequity within the ranks of government
employees. The pay scale for this team could breed resentment
among other government lawyers (including senior management), and
could also become the mantra for disgruntled advocates of other pro-
grams: "If we can afford to pay a salary of $X to a government tax
lawyer," they will say, "then surely we can afford my program." This
proposal is not free of political issues, then, but the benefits would be
quite significant if it was adopted.
B. Project-Based Recruits
In addition to recruiting full-time employees, the government also
can reinforce tax administration by adding part-time employees (and,
in some cases, volunteers) to assist with particular matters. This Sec-
tion considers some potentially promising options that should be rela-
tively affordable and conflict-free.
1. Legal Academics
An important source of experts, who will not face the same incen-
tive problems as private lawyers, are legal academics. 45 Tax professors
44 I am indebted to David Miller for this suggestion.
45 I am indebted to Marvin Chirelstein and Alex Raskolnikov for this insight.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 59:
ENLISTING THE TAX BAR
have expertise in both legal and policy analysis, and many have prac-
tice experience. Assuming they do not have private sector clients-
and many do not-they do not face client conflicts in assisting the
government with law reform or litigation.
To my mind, academics are a significantly underutilized resource.
In part, the reason is that academics sometimes focus on research that
does not have immediate practical application. This research is still
valuable, of course, in illuminating fundamental questions about the
ideal system, in exposing hidden premises, and the like.
But it is regrettable that some academics believe this is the only
research that advances their reputations within the academy, and that
more grounded projects are thought to be less helpful or even
counterproductive. This view is altogether too common and it is quite
unfortunate, as it erodes the connection between the academy and the
bar. This is a missed opportunity. The system can benefit enormously
from academic expertise, and academics can benefit enormously from
the sense of purpose and accomplishment that comes with a concrete
contribution to reform. In the tradition of Boris Bittker and Stanley
Surrey, academics should devote some of their time to research that
has a practical payoff, critiquing specific cases, rulings, or statutory
provisions and offering reform alternatives that are capable of imple-
mentation. For example, Alvin Warren has written a thoughtful arti-
cle on the challenges of taxing a company on transactions involving
options on its own stock.46 Dan Shaviro has written a valuable article
on the interest allocation rules,47 and David Weisbach has recently
advised the President's commission on tax reform. 48 These sorts of
projects can have an enormously positive impact on our system.
To do this sort of research effectively, academics should view inter-
actions with the government as valuable field research, exposing them
to novel issues and enriching their understanding. In exchange for
access, some academics would share their expertise free of charge or,
certainly, for relatively modest levels of funding. An added benefit to
academics is that they can use the relationship to educate the govern-
ment about their ideas, thereby increasing the probability that their
proposals will be implemented. As a result, the IRS Chief Counsel's
Office is wise to have a professor-in-residence program but it should
also involve academics in individual projects as consultants.
46 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Taxation of Options on the Issuer's Stock, Taxes, Mar. 2004, at
47.
47 Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1189
(1989).
48 See President's Advisory Panel on Federal Taxation Reform, Press Release, Tax
Panel Announces Witness List for Fourth Meeting on March 16th, http://www.
taxreformpanel.gov/press/press-posting-3112005.shtml.
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2. Bar Associations
Although academics can be helpful, private lawyers obviously have
an even deeper reservoir of knowledge about aggressive tax planning.
The challenge, of course, is to find ways for them to offer this knowl-
edge free (or, at least, relatively free) of the conflict they face in help-
ing the government.
To an extent, bar associations provide this sort of setting. For exam-
ple, the New York State Bar Association's Tax Section writes influen-
tial reports about regulatory projects and other reforms. 49 (In the
interest of full disclosure, I should say that I have been a member of
the NYSBA Tax Section's Executive Committee for nearly a decade.)
It is a matter of pride for the group that they focus on systemic con-
cerns, not taxpayer interests. The government obviously is well aware
of these reports, and relies on them for technical advice. As Rostain
has emphasized, the ABA and the NYSBA have taken positions on
tax shelters that run contrary to the interests of their clients. 50 An
important reason why they can do this, which she does not mention, is
the protection offered by collective authorship. Although reports
have principal authors, these authors speak for the group, not for
themselves. As a result, it is "safer" to expose client abuses in these
collectively written reports, as opposed to solo-authored articles. This
"safety in numbers" phenomenon is at least a partial remedy for the
conflict.
Of course, the idea that bar associations are vehicles to help the
government should not be overstated, since they sometimes serve as
interest groups to champion the interests of lawyers and their clients. 51
Indeed, another way to interpret the bar association's position on tax
shelters is as an effort to protect the interests of the elite bar. The
comparative advantage of elite lawyers is in giving accurate predic-
tions about what a court will do and, in the case of tax shelters, this
often means saying "no." If government enforcement is weak,
though, taxpayers may be less interested in accurate advice (the tax
49 For the reports published since 2000, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Reports 2006,
available at http://www.nysba.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositelD=66.
50 See Rostain, note 6, at 80, 97.
51 Some pro-government tax lawyers have told me that they feel less at home in bar
committees than they used to, and that the younger generation of bar leaders is more
prone to taxpayer advocacy. This may be a symptom of a broader generational trend
within the tax bar, which others have observed. See, e.g., Bankman, note 1, at 1784-85
(discussing the evolution in business and legal thinking about tax shelters). This may be a
product of the greater focus on the bottom line at law firms in recent years. Perhaps two
decades ago, bar work was really a pro bono activity and was encouraged. In contrast,
today it stands out as nonbillable and some tax lawyers think it may be easier to do if it can
be justified as somehow making the law better for clients. I am indebted to Deborah
Schenk for this observation.
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bar's comparative advantage), and more interested in a less expert
(and less principled) advisor who will simply facilitate the aggressive
transaction. 52 In response to this competition (from accounting firms,
among others), it is rational for a self-interested elite lawyer to want
government enforcement to improve as a way to raise the value of
their services, and thus to help them beat back the competition.
3. Law Firms
In addition to relying on private lawyers to volunteer their services
through bar associations, the government also can retain elite practi-
tioners for discrete projects instead of as full-time employees, just as
corporate clients do. This course has the advantage of using elite law-
yers most efficiently-only when their services are especially valuable.
This approach also avoids the need to raise government salaries across
the board or to tolerate significant inequities in the pay scale for in-
house government lawyers. Although the legal fees could be substan-
tial-itself a separate political issue, to be sure-it is possible that pri-
vate lawyers will offer a discounted rate in return for the prestige of
working on an especially important matter. In any event, the eco-
nomic benefits of having top talent involved should justify the cost, for
all the reasons mentioned above. A precedent for this sort of arrange-
ment is that the government hired David Boies, a top antitrust litiga-
tor, to represent the U.S. government in its suit against Microsoft.5 3
There is still the issue of conflicts, though. Will a lawyer feel com-
fortable representing the United States on tax issues, or will she (and
her partners) be concerned about losing private clients? Can a private
lawyer represent the United States faithfully without also worrying
about the interests of their other clients?
The context that seems freest of conflicts-and thus most promis-
ing-is tax litigation. In cases with significant precedential value, the
government would be well advised to hire a leading practitioner, and
this lawyer would have clear incentives to win. After all, success or
failure is highly visible, so that the lawyer would have strong reputa-
tional interests in providing vigorous advocacy. Of course, if a lawyer
helped develop an aggressive strategy, she is not the right person to
litigate the issue for the government. The same probably is true if her
52 Put another way, if all you need is an opinion-any opinion, which could provide pen-
alty protection-you do not need to hire one of the leading lights of the profession. This
issue is discussed below in Part IV.
53 See generally David Boies, Courting Justice: From NY Yankees v. Major League
Baseball to Bush v. Gore 1997-2000 (2005). Boies charged the government a steeply dis-
counted rate. See Daniel Okrent, Get Me Boies, Time, Dec. 17, 2000, available at http:I/
www.time.com/time/poy2000/mag/boies.html (noting that Boies charged only $40 per hour,
compared with his usual $750 per hour rate at the time).
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partner developed the strategy. Given the large pool of private sector
talent, though, it ought to be possible to retain a tax litigator who has
not had contact with the relevant issue before.
In addition to litigation, elite law firms could advise on regulatory
projects and statutory drafting. They could be asked, for example, to
draft a regulation. The government could then review the work, but
this input from leading lawyers could move the process along more
quickly. It is possible, moreover, that lawyers would work for a dis-
counted rate, or even for free, if they were given credit for their
work.54 A practitioner could find it valuable, in attracting clients, to
be able to say that she drafted a relevant regulation. In a sense, the
government would be paying in prestige, rather than in cash.
The conflict issue seems more difficult in this context than in litiga-
tion, however, in part because the scope of the project is less con-
tained. A lawyer's other clients will not be interested in the details of
a litigation (for example, what discovery motions are filed, what the
opening statement will be, and the like), but they will be very inter-
ested in the progress of a regulatory project. Could a lawyer share
this insight-arguably a proprietary secret of the government-with
private clients? Correspondingly, if a lawyer learns about planning
opportunities through work for clients, could the lawyer use this
knowledge-arguably proprietary information of the client-in help-
ing the government to tighten up the relevant provision? If they did,
clients would become more wary of consulting them in the future.
Likewise, there is a risk that a practitioner would deliberately leave
gaps in a regulation he drafts for the government, and then would
steer his clients through these loopholes. To an extent, though, this
risk is mitigated if government lawyers (and even other private practi-
tioners) review the language before it is finalized.
C. The Promise and Pitfalls of Private Attorneys General
The problems of government resource constraints and private sec-
tor incentives are not unique to the tax system. For example, the SEC
does not have a large or highly compensated staff.55 Neither does the
54 For example, David Hariton, a highly regarded practitioner at Sullivan & Cromwell,
helped to draft the contingent debt regulations, offering his services pro bono. Likewise,
Gordon Henderson, a distinguished practitioner from Weil Gotshal, responded to pro-
posed regulations under § 752 by submitting alternative language, and the government
drew heavily on his language in finalizing the regulation. I am indebted to Mark Leeds for
informing me of Henderson's role.
55 In 2005, the SEC had only 3,865 employees, and paid those employees about $416
million cumulatively. SEC Ann. Rep. 6163 (2005).
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EEOC.56 As noted above, an important difference is that in these
regulatory areas, and others as well, the government authorizes pri-
vate actions. As a result, plaintiffs' lawyers, working for contingent
fees, are supposed to pick up some of the slack.
The tax system does not have private actions under current law but,
at least in theory, it could. Congress could authorize qui tam actions,
in which private citizens sue to collect taxes for the federal govern-
ment, and keep a share of the recovery as a contingent fee. Before
briefly surveying the merits of these private tax actions, I should state
at the outset that this idea is politically implausible, at least for the
foreseeable future. Not only is tax enforcement unpopular, but so too
are trial lawyers, and this idea combines both.
Even so, private tax actions do address the problems identified in
this Article, at least to a degree. Potentially lucrative contingent fees
could attract a corps of extremely capable lawyers, who would be
more of a match for the private bar than government lawyers cur-
rently are. The allegiance of these lawyers would be to the tax base,
not to taxpayers. The prospect of being sued is likely to deter some
aggressive planning.
Although this idea has advantages, it has many serious problems as
well, which, on balance, leave me skeptical. This idea is worth an arti-
cle of its own, but I use only a couple of paragraphs to highlight four
problems. First, as with other class action or plaintiffs suits, there is
the concern of frivolous strike suits. It is commonly observed that
plaintiff's lawyers sue corporations every time the stock price declines,
and that it is often cheaper to pay them off than to litigate. By anal-
ogy, it obviously is problematic for taxpayers to feel pressured to set-
tle, even if their transaction is uncontroversial. This problem might be
ameliorated, to a degree, by requiring private tax collectors to secure
approval from the government before bringing suit, and again for set-
tlements. But government supervision is a solution only if govern-
ment officials have an incentive to say "no" to frivolous cases, and the
time and expertise to discern the true value of a case. I doubt they
would, so I view the problem of frivolous suits as extremely serious.
Second, there is the risk of collusion between taxpayers and these
private tax collectors. For example, if a taxpayer can secure a final
judgment in settling a private suit-and thus is insulated from other
suits, including by the government-there is room for a deal at the gov-
ernment's expense. The taxpayer offers the private tax collector a set-
tlement, complete with a generous fee, for very little work; in return,
the taxpayer is protected from further trouble. Indeed, taxpayers are
56 In 2005, the EEOC had about 2,300 employees and paid those employees about $225
million cumulatively. EEOC Ann. Rep. (2005).
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even happier if, in settling, they assure no further action-not just on
the narrow issue that was settled-but on a more broadly defined set of
issues that are related in some way to the one that was settled. The
potential for abuse is easy to see. 57 Government or judicial oversight
of settlements helps address this problem, but, again, only if it is effec-
tive. It is worth emphasizing a reason why government oversight is
unlikely to be effective: The premise behind creating a class of private
attorneys general is that the government is overstretched. If private
attorneys general require significant government oversight, they have
much less to add to the system.
Third, there is a trade-off between protecting taxpayer privacy and
arming private tax collectors with the information they need to iden-
tify underpayments and bring suit. Under current law, taxpayer re-
turns are confidential, and the Service does not share them with
anyone-not even with other parts of the federal government, such as
the SEC.5 8 Under these conditions, private suits obviously are not
possible. The government would have to allow some disclosure. This
is not necessarily a problem in principle, since the privacy concerns
that apply to an individual seem less compelling for a public company.
It may be that these returns, or designated excerpts from them, could
be publicly disclosed. Private tax collectors then might be given spe-
cial discovery power (perhaps under government or judicial supervi-
sion), subject to a confidentiality obligation. Yet, this is a logistically
challenging road. Another alternative is to give private tax collectors
access to the special tax shelter disclosures mentioned above, and to
authorize these private actions, and whatever further discovery is nec-
essary, only for such transactions. Needless to say, this would be ex-
tremely controversial.
Finally, another potential problem with private tax actions is the
somewhat counterintuitive problem of over-enforcement. In the cur-
rent environment, it is perhaps hard to imagine too many resources
being devoted to tax enforcement, since our current system is so over-
stretched. But just as we do not want to under-invest in enforcement,
we also do not want to over-invest. For example, a private tax collec-
tor would have the incentive to spend up to one dollar to collect a
dollar fee. If the contingent fee were one-third, private collectors
would be willing to spend up to one dollar to collect three dollars in
tax, which is almost surely too much. 59 To an extent, the problem can
57 See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Law Firm Offers an Unusual Fee in KPMG Case, Wall St.
J., Jan. 27, 2006, at C1 (describing allegation that lawyers representing plaintiffs are collud-
ing with defendant KPMG).
58 See Anna Bernasek, Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn't?, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 2006, § 3, at 3.
59 See note 21.
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be mitigated by mandating that fees cannot exceed a fixed percentage
of the tax collected (for example, 5%). But even then, the govern-
ment should be wary of surrendering control over the number of suits
brought, or the minimum level of tax that must be at issue in order to
justify a suit. This problem is likely to be solvable, but only with care-
ful thought and a fairly elaborate administrative apparatus supervising
the private tax collectors; but, of course, having to field an elaborate
system of supervision undercuts the original advantage of private
suits-that is, that they supplement scarce government enforcement
resources.
IV. ENLISTING PRIVATE LAWYERS: FIND (OR CREATE) COMMON
INTERESTS WITH THE CLIENT, AND THE LAWYER WILL FOLLOW
Having considered various ways in which the government can hire
advisors to work for them directly-either as full-time employees, on a
project basis, or as a team of private attorneys general-the next ques-
tion is whether the government can draw on the expertise of private
lawyers without hiring them. Given the political constraints on hiring
elite lawyers directly, it would be desirable to tap into their expertise
and information some other way.
I consider a range of ideas in this Part and the next, and some are
more promising than others. Part IV identifies a range of contexts in
which the interests of the government align with the interests of the
client. In those cases, the tax bar is motivated to help the government,
since the bar is advancing client interests in the process. Part V moves
to the harder set of cases in which the client's interests do not support
cooperation with the government.
A. Finding Common Interests with Taxpayers
Since lawyers have ample reason to champion their clients' inter-
ests, the government can take advantage of the private bar's expertise
in situations in which the client wants to cooperate with the govern-
ment. This Section considers situations in which the client already is
motivated to cooperate. Once the client wants to help, the lawyer ob-
viously will do so dutifully-and, perhaps, even cheerfully.
1. Taxpayer's Incentive to Kill a Competitor's Deal
The most straightforward example-but one that has not received
enough systematic attention-is for the government to take advantage
of rivalries among taxpayers. For instance, if one investment bank
(Innovator) has developed a tax-advantaged strategy, and a competing
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investment bank (Competitor) is not able to offer it-either because
they think it does not work, or because they are entering the market
too late-Competitor has the incentive to kill Innovator's deal. Com-
petitor will want its lawyer to notify the government of this new strat-
egy, and to explain its vulnerabilities. This might be done discreetly
(for example, by calling or even sending an anonymous envelope to
the Service), or it might even be done openly (for example, by pub-
lishing an article in Tax Notes). They are more likely to be discreet in
order to avoid damaging their reputation (for example, with the rival
investment bank's clients), but, either way, the government gains ac-
cess to valuable information and expertise.
This dynamic is not unique to the financial sector or to those who
develop shelters. Potential users can be a resource too. Consider two
rival consumer products companies, of which one has an aggressive
tax director (Aggressive Co.) and the other has a conservative tax di-
rector (Conservative Co.). If Aggressive Co. uses a tax shelter to re-
duce its tax cost, and then passes some of this cost on to consumers in
the form of lower prices, Conservative Co. finds itself at a competitive
disadvantage. Assuming that Conservative Co. is unwilling to adopt
the same tax strategy, it has a strong incentive to stop its competitor
from using it. It would be willing to pay its lawyer to place a discreet
call to the government.
Although the government already benefits from this dynamic to a
degree,60 the government should take more systematic advantage of it
in at least two ways, neither of which, to my knowledge, has been
discussed in the literature. First, the government should be more ag-
gressive in offering bounties to informants, including former employ-
ees of the taxpayer, or employees of the taxpayer's rival.61 Second, a
concerted effort should be made to ask companies about their com-
petitors' tax planning. For example, auditors can be instructed to ask
something like, "Are there aggressive practices common in your in-
dustry that you do not use and, if so, what are they? How do they
work? And how can we identify them?" If companies are rewarded
for producing this information-for instance, by developing a better
rapport with their auditor in showing that they abstain from unsavory
60 When this Article was discussed at a session of approximately two dozen leading prac-
titioners, they immediately came up with three examples of transactions that had been shut
down because of this sort of "tip" from a competitor: step-down preferred, aggressive uses
of Canadian income trusts, and commodities swaps. This conversation occurred on Febru-
ary 27, 2006 at a meeting of the Tax Club in New York City.
61 In the latter case, the bounty arguably should not go to the individual employee of the
taxpayer's rival, but to the corporation itself, since the employee's knowledge is a corpo-
rate asset.
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practices-they are likely to be forthcoming, thereby giving the govern-
ment a useful source of information.
This is not to say that competitors will always be forthcoming. For
example, they will hesitate if they fear an overbroad government re-
sponse. If they are engaging in conduct similar enough to be swept up
in an overbroad response, they will not share the information.
In cases where the government does get this sort of information, it
obviously needs to respond-something that, unfortunately, it does not
always do. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the government to wait
months or even years before responding to a planning technique that
has been openly discussed. 62 In other words, in addition to finding
new sources of information, the government needs to make better use
of the information it already has. Ironically, "tips" from competitors
serve another function as well-as a source not just of information, but
also of motivation. In some cases, the government is slow to react to
an abusive transaction for political reasons. Countervailing political
pressure from competitors can motivate (or even embarrass) the gov-
ernment into action.
2. Taxpayer's Incentive to Assist in Law Reform: Narrowing
Overbroad Rules
Just as taxpayers have an incentive to help the government kill a
competitor's deals, they also have an incentive to help the government
make overly harsh rules more lenient. In other words, even if taxpay-
ers are reluctant to tell the government about a bad transaction that
the law technically allows, they are very motivated to tell the govern-
ment about a good transaction that the law inadvertently prevents.63
When the government targets an abuse, therefore, it is well advised
to propose a rule that is broader than necessary. To be clear, it may
not wish to announce that it is doing this deliberately, as such an an-
nouncement could trigger a political outcry. Such an announcement is
unnecessary, though. The tax bar will see that the rule is over-
broad-whether or not it is announced as such-and the government
then can rely on the tax bar, whose clients will want them to help
narrow it. In this way, the bar and the government have a similar
goal. They cooperate to modify the rule in order to permit desirable
transactions.
62 For example, commentators have understood for some time that the Achilles heel of
tax-free hedging is the counterparty's interest in borrowing the taxpayer's stock, and po-
tential problems under § 1058. Schizer, note 3, at 1355. The government waited nearly five
years before responding. Lee A. Sheppard, Should Share Lending Affect a Prepaid For-
ward Contract, 110 Tax Notes 12 (Jan. 9, 2006).
63 See Schizer, note 3, at 1337.
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Admittedly, the incentives do not align perfectly. The government
wants to be sure that, in narrowing the rule, it still blocks all variations
of the abusive transaction. The bar is less worried about that. Indeed,
there is the risk that the bar will propose language that spares not only
a meritorious transaction, but also an abusive one.64 The government
needs to be sensitive to this risk, and to take the bar's advice with a
grain of salt. But the opportunity for collaboration is there, neverthe-
less, and is likely to be familiar to many readers.
B. Creating Common Interests with Taxpayers
Through the Penalty Structure
If taxpayers truly feared the consequences of overly aggressive posi-
tions, they would have a strong interest in carefully complying with
the law. Obviously, this has not been the case in recent years. Penal-
ties have not been stiff enough to compensate for the low probability
of detection. 65 The government has moved in the right direction by
toughening the penalty structure through recent legislation, but more
needs to be done.66
The guiding principle ought to be increasing marginal deterrence. 67
Taxpayers ought to feel that, by taking riskier positions, they signifi-
cantly increase the penalty they would incur if caught. This means
that the penalty for fraud needs not only to be high in absolute terms,
but also to be substantially higher than the penalty for negligence. By
moving from a position that is debatable (or merely sloppy) to some-
thing that is clearly over the line, taxpayers should become exposed to
a newly daunting level of risk.
While this is a familiar point, there is an important implication that
has not been sufficiently appreciated: By tweaking the penalty struc-
ture in the right way, the government enlists help from the private bar.
As long as the penalty structure is sufficiently daunting, clients will
want their lawyers to help them steer clear of overly aggressive struc-
tures. This, of course, is exactly what the government should want tax
lawyers to do. The private bar is, in effect, doing the government's
work, monitoring transactions to make sure they are not too aggres-
sive. In other words, the right penalty structure aligns the interests of
the taxpayer with those of the government, and thus allows the gov-
64 This pattern has played out with the new disclosure regime, discussed below. It was
overbroad, and the bar has worked with the government to develop "angel lists," but tax-
payers analogize to transactions on this list in order to conclude that they do not have to
disclose transactions that, in light of the purposes of the regime, should be disclosed.
65 Raskolnikov, note 9, at 19-20.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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ernment to rely on the private tax bar to police the system. To achieve
this goal, though, the penalty structure must be crafted with care. The
rest of this Section considers variations in the penalty structure, with a
particular focus on the role of tax opinions.
1. The Conflict Inherent in Tax Opinions
What if the tax lawyer, in providing a written opinion that a transac-
tion is taxed in a particular way, is able to offer a "get out of penalties
free" card? This generally was thought to be the case, at least until
recently.68 As long as a taxpayer received an opinion indicating that a
position was more likely than not to succeed, the taxpayer would
claim to have reasonable cause to believe in her position, and thus
would not expect penalties to be imposed. 69 Likewise, the tax director
of a corporation can expect to keep her job, even if a tax strategy
proves unsuccessful, as long as she secured an opinion from an outside
firm. In authorizing tax lawyers to provide penalty protection (and
thus "job insurance" for the tax director as well), the government, in
effect, is enlisting the tax bar to monitor their clients, so that they will
make sure their transactions comply with the law.
As an effort to enlist the tax bar's help, the practice of allowing
penalty protection through tax opinions has a distinct advantage over,
say, a mandate requiring tax lawyers to "rat" on clients who are en-
gaged in overly aggressive transactions. In acting as a source of poten-
tially compromising information on clients, the lawyer is not offering
the client anything of value. In contrast, in offering a tax opinion for a
transaction, the advisor is, indeed, providing something of value. At
first blush, this privileging of tax opinions seems to strengthen the
hand of the tax lawyer, giving her leverage to extract concessions from
the client. "Structure the deal this way," the lawyer can say, "or I will
not give you the opinion." This at least creates the basis for coopera-
tion between lawyers and clients-the possibility of common interests,
as lawyers work with clients to ensure that transactions are not too
aggressive, and reward them for doing the right thing.
But it is a familiar point that, in a competitive environment, the tax
lawyer's hand is not strong enough. If lawyers have this valuable car-
rot to offer, taxpayers will want to gobble it up, even if they have not
68 See Rostain, note 6, at 107.
69 Even though many taxpayers believed this, the relevant regulation, § 1.6664-
4(e)(2)(B)(2) (as of April 2003), did not quite say this, and in fact, a court recently imposed
a penalty on a taxpayer that had an opinion. See Long Term Capital Management v.
United States, 330 F. Supp.2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff'd 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005). A
recent change in the penalty structure, discussed below, at Subsection IV.B.4, imposes
strict liability for "reportable" transactions that have not been disclosed.
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earned it. "Give me the opinion or I will take my business elsewhere"
is the implicit (or sometimes even the explicit) message that clients
send. 70 The result is a familiar race to the bottom, which the govern-
ment has sought to reverse through a range of recent initiatives.
1. Strict Liability
The cleanest way to avoid this race to the bottom-but, unfortu-
nately, one that has not been adopted on a broad scale71- is to strip
away the penalty protection function from tax opinions. Under this
approach, the fact that a taxpayer received an opinion of counsel no
longer would be relevant in determining whether penalties should be
imposed; rather, the penalty determination would depend only on
how aggressive the transaction was. As a result, the tax opinion would
offer a prediction, not inherent protection. It would play an important
role in forecasting what the taxpayer's exposure actually is, but only if
it is honestly and carefully done. If you win the case-because your
deal is not too aggressive-you avoid penalties. But if you lose, you
are penalized. If your lawyer advises you properly on the chances of
winning, you know what the risks are, and you know what an appro-
priate settlement is as well. But an opinion no longer would have in-
herent value. Instead, it becomes only as valuable as the advice it
gives.
Under this approach, endorsed by the New York State Bar Associa-
tion Tax Section, the lawyer's incentive would be exactly what it
should be: to tell the client, in plain terms, exactly how aggressive a
transaction is.72 There no longer would be any race to the bottom,
since the lawyer could not deliver anything of value by offering an
overly favorable conclusion. By retooling the function of opinions in
this way, the government enlists the help of the private bar: An ex-
pert is deployed for each transaction, in real time, to offer honest ad-
vice against taking overly aggressive positions.
This approach, paired with an adequate penalty structure, would go
a long way toward incentivizing the bar to help the government-not
out of altruism, but out of fealty to client interests. This is not to say,
though, that the approach is uncontroversial. Are we really prepared
70 See Bankman, note 1, at 1782-83.
71 Narrow variations of a strict liability regime have been enacted for specified circum-
stances, and are discussed below, at Subsection IV.B.5. The opinion of a disqualified tax
advisor does not provide penalty protection, and an opinion offers no penalty protection
for a reportable transaction that was not disclosed.
72 See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Sec., Report on Corporate Tax Shelters (Apr. 23, 1999),
99 TNT 82-29, Apr. 23, 1999, available in LEXIS, TNT File; see also Deborah H. Schenk,
The Circular 230 Amendments: Time to Throw Them Out and Start Over, 110 Tax Notes
1311 (Mar. 20, 2006).
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to impose penalties when people believed in good faith, based on the
advice of counsel, that they were complying with the law? If a lawyer
offers an opinion in good faith, shouldn't that opinion in turn demon-
strate good faith on the part of the client? These arguments have po-
litical resonance, even though, in my opinion, they are unpersuasive.
After all, many favorable opinions are not offered in good faith-that
is precisely the problem. For those that are offered in good faith, I
would leave it to the judge, or to the government official considering a
settlement, to make a judgment about the appropriate penalty. Or, as
a compromise, the penalty structure could be segmented, so that an
"information asymmetry charge" of, say, 10% is automatically im-
posed (that is, under strict liability) and an additional 15% penalty
would be imposed for bad faith.73 But I realize that this approach is
unlikely to be enacted in a comprehensive way. For political reasons,
we are destined to allow tax opinions to provide some version of pen-
alty protection. How can we do this without triggering the familiar
race to the bottom?
2. Turning Competition Among Tax Advisors to the Government's
Advantage
Although every tax lawyer feels pressure to give an opinion that a
competitor would give, it is not accurate to describe the problem as a
single and unified race to the bottom. Rather, there are a number of
different races occurring at different tiers of the profession. For ex-
ample, the fact that a second-tier accounting firm will give a favorable
opinion is of real interest to another second-tier accounting firm, but
it is not particularly important to Sullivan & Cromwell. On the other
hand, Sullivan & Cromwell will be extremely interested to know if
another top law firm, such as Clearly Gottlieb, is willing to give a
favorable opinion. Another way to make this point is that it is a mat-
ter of pride-and, indeed, self interest-to refuse to give some opin-
ions. This is the way tax advisors build their reputations and signal the
quality of their advice. If a firm says "no" to many deals, then the fact
that it says "yes" has real meaning (and thus can be the subject of
premium billing).
This sorting process-and the competition among advisors that ani-
mates it-represents a possible brake on the race to the bottom, as
long as the government takes proper advantage of it. Lawyers will
want conservative reputations, and clients will want to hire such law-
yers, if the government treats opinions of conservative lawyers more
favorably than opinions of aggressive ones. If the market comes to
73 I am indebted to Edward Kleinbard for this suggestion.
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believe that an opinion from a conservative firm is a necessity, and an
opinion from a more aggressive competitor is valueless, then con-
servative advisors will have more bargaining power to hold clients to a
higher standard. Again, the private bar would be doing the govern-
ment's work.
Although this insight is familiar, there obviously are a number of
ways to operationalize it that, to my knowledge, have never been dis-
cussed in the literature. One is for the government to keep a list of
aggressive advisors. A lawyer joins this list by giving favorable opin-
ions for shelters that have been rejected in court, or favorable opin-
ions for so-called listed transactions (that is, transactions designated
suspect by the Service). 74 Of course, individual lawyers already have
developed reputations with individual government lawyers, either for
trustworthiness or for unreliability, but a list would strengthen the ef-
fect of these reputations in two ways. First, it would institutionalize
these reputations so that they survive turnover in the government's
ranks. Second, if the list is made public, clients would learn whom the
government considers untrustworthy. The list would embarrass these
advisors, and the prospect of appearing on it might deter lawyers from
giving aggressive opinions.
At the other end of the spectrum, the government can look for ways
to reinforce the reputations of conservative practitioners, however de-
fined. For example, the government could create an expedited reve-
nue ruling process for these lawyers. This could be quite attractive,
since the current ruling process's glacial pace renders it useless in
many contexts. In the same spirit, the government could rely on a
(rebuttable) presumption that lawyers who have served in govern-
ment are conservative, as a way to encourage government service.75
3. Mandates and Penalties: Circular 230
Are there other ways to encourage the bar to give opinions only for
deserving transactions? One way that lawyers have blessed undeserv-
ing transactions was to give only a partial opinion, which made unreal-
istic factual assumptions (for example, "in giving this opinion, we rely
on your representation that there is a realistic possibility to make a
pretax profit") or declined to address important anti-abuse doctrines
(for example, "in giving this opinion, we do not consider the applica-
74 See Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (defining listed transactions); http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/articlelO,id=120633,00.html (describing listed transactions).
75 There may be need for a process to appeal the government's decision to deny this
benefit to practitioners who are deemed to be insufficiently conservative, and there is al-
ways the concern that inappropriate factors will be considered in awarding some lawyers a
special status that is denied to others.
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tion of the doctrines of economic substance and business purpose").
Quite appropriately, the government has responded by requiring advi-
sors to address all the relevant legal issues, including anti-abuse doc-
trines that might be relevant, and to scrutinize the facts, so that they
do not rely on patently unrealistic representations. 76
Circular 230's various technical problems are explored elsewhere,
so I do not detail them here,77 except to say that this is a case in which
the government has not been careful enough with the bar's time. For
example, they should have used an "opt-in" regime, in which lawyers
affirmatively state when an opinion can be used for penalty protec-
tion. Instead, they created an "opt-out" regime, in which lawyers
have to say when their advice cannot be so used.78 The result has
been a frenzy of legending, so that every e-mail sent by a tax lawyer,
including ones accepting a dinner invitation, automatically says that it
cannot be used for penalty protection. "Highly compensated tax advi-
sors have spent time debating such questions," Michael Schler has ob-
served, "as whether the legend must be above the signature in an e-
mail, or may be below the signature . . . . ,,79 I doubt anyone would
defend this use of the bar's expertise.
Putting aside these excesses, though, Circular 230 is, at its core, an
effort by the government to enlist the tax bar's help. In requiring law-
yers to verify facts and address all relevant issues, the government is
relying on them to monitor clients, and to give opinions (and thus the
potential for penalty protection) only when they are deserved. This
initiative has both the promise and the problems associated with tax
opinions, as discussed above. 80 In asking lawyers to monitor their cli-
ents, the initiative is strengthened by the fact that lawyers have some-
thing of value to give to their clients-so that they can feel, to a
degree, as if they are serving client interests-but, at the same time,
the inherent conflict remains: Clients want opinions even when they
do not deserve them.
The new rules make it more difficult for lawyers to give penalty-
protection opinions for undeserving transactions, to be sure, but much
depends on whether the penalties for noncompliance are adequate.
For example, a lawyer can be barred for life from practice before the
76 Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2004).
77 See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Paravano & Melinda Reynolds, The New Circular 230 Regula-
tions-Best Practices or Scarlet Letter, 46 Tax Mgmt. Memo 339 (Aug. 22, 2005); see also
Michael Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 109 Tax
Notes 915 (Nov. 14, 2005).
78 See Schenk, note 72 (advocating an opt-in regime).
79 See Schler, note 77, at 921.
80 See Subsection IV.B.1.
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Service,81 a step that would be very embarrassing and could lead to
disbarment in some states; but, of course, the Service has not sought
to impose this sanction yet, even in egregious cases, leaving the bar to
wonder whether they can safely ignore this possibility. In any event,
the function of the penalty provision is to drive a wedge between the
lawyer's interest and the client's, focusing lawyers on the need to pro-
tect themselves. In this way, the penalty provision is less like the ini-
tiatives discussed in this Subsection-which assume that the lawyer's
loyalty will remain with the client and try to align the client's incen-
tives with the government-and is more like the initiatives discussed
in Section V, which try to detach the lawyer's loyalty from the client.
4. Separating Deal Practice from Opinion Practice
In still another effort to ensure that tax opinions are rendered hon-
estly, the government no longer allows lawyers to give opinions on
certain "reportable" transactions 82-a category that is designed to de-
scribe tax shelters, but is widely known by tax lawyers to be both
under- and over-inclusive 3-if they (or their firm) have billed
enough hours developing the transaction. In fashioning this category
of "disqualified advisor," the government presumably was targeting
shelter promoters. But the definition sweeps more broadly so that, in
effect, a lawyer who is implementing the transaction cannot give an
opinion about it. "As a result," Schler has observed, "if the taxpayer
desires penalty protection, it must use one firm to draft the documents
for the transaction and another firm to give an opinion on the tax
consequences of the transaction. 's4
One advantage of this division of roles-that is, of having a "deal"
counsel and a separate "opinion" counsel-is that, from the perspec-
tive of the deal counsel, the regime feels a lot like the strict liability
81 Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.50(a) (2004).
82 Transactions are reportable if they satisfy any one of five filters: (1) listed transac-
tions, (2) transactions in which the advisor imposes a condition of confidentiality to protect
the advisor's planning strategy, (3) transactions in which the advisor's fee is contingent on
the success of the planning strategy, (4) transactions in which a gross loss exceeds certain
thresholds, and (5) transactions that involve credits and short holding periods for assets.
See IRC § 6111(a); Reg. §§ 301.6112-(1)(c), 1.6011-4; Notice 2005-22, 2005-1 C.B. 756.
83 For example, many nonabusive transactions involve a large loss, since taxpayers
sometimes genuinely do lose money. At the same time, the filters leave out significant
issues as well. For example, although losses under § 165 have to be reported, losses under
§ 162 do not. Schler, note 77, at 917.
84 Schler, note 77, at 918. The regime applies only if certain modest fee thresholds are
reached-250,000 for C corporations and $50,000 for other taxpayers, Reg. § 301.6112-
1(c)-and only if a significant purpose of the transaction is tax avoidance, but this phrase
applies to many transactions that are not shelters. See, e.g., Cottage Savings Assn. v. Com-
missioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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regime recommended above: the incentive of deal counsel is to give
honest advice, since offering an overly optimistic opinion is not an
option for them anyway. Notice, though, that the same benefit is
available by disqualifying all lawyers, not just deal counsel, from giv-
ing penalty protection through an opinion, as recommended above.85
In theory, there might be an advantage in preserving the penalty
protection function of opinions, but cordoning it off so that it is availa-
ble only through a separate set of opinion counsel. This division of
rules is appealing, though, only if we think opinion counsel are more
independent than deal counsel, and thus are more likely to give an
unbiased opinion. The argument for this independence is that opinion
counsel are not personally invested in the success of the deal, and they
also may not have a preexisting client relationship with the taxpayer.
Of course, even if we accept this premise, so that we think opinion
counsel can make a valuable contribution, the current rules constrain
them in bizarre ways. For example, they are not allowed to suggest
"material" modifications in the structure; if they do, they too become
disqualified. 86 As Schler has observed, this means opinion counsel
"can either (1) suggest the changes, helping the taxpayer on the merits
but hurting the taxpayer on penalty protection, or (2) refrain from
suggesting the changes and give the opinion nonetheless, hurting the
taxpayer on the merits but helping the taxpayer on penalty
protection. '87
Although this sort of glitch is probably fixable, and it is worth
preventing actual shelter promoters (as opposed to advisors on regu-
lar business deals) from giving opinions that provide penalty protec-
tion, I am skeptical about the value, in general, of looking to separate
opinion counsel, because I doubt that they are more independent. Al-
though opinion counsel may sort among "conservative" and "aggres-
sive," as noted above, 88 there is no reason to think they are more
likely to do so than deal counsel. Indeed, opinion counsel have their
own reasons to engage in a race to the bottom. If they develop a
reputation for readily blessing deals, they are more likely to be hired.
Advisors may be particularly eager for this work as an opportunity to
get a new client, since they may hope that, if they make a good im-
pression, they will be the deal counsel next time. But even if they
expect only to drum up more business as opinion counsel, this will be
appealing because such work is interesting and relatively easy. Opin-
ion counsel do not have to negotiate deal terms, or draft deal docu-
85 See Subsection IV.B.1.
86 See Schler, note 77, at 918; Notice 2005-12, 2005-1 C.B. 494.
87 Schler, note 77, at 918.
88 See Subsection IV.B.2.
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ments in the middle of the night. They have to understand the
structure and the relevant law-with the assistance of deal counsel,
obviously-and then write up the analysis. If they can bill premium
rates, the engagement is quite attractive. In addition, if opinion coun-
sel has made a regular practice of issuing aggressive opinions, the in-
cremental risk from giving one more aggressive opinion is modest.
For all these reasons, the incentives of opinion counsel strike me as no
better, on average, than the incentives of deal counsel (aside, of
course, from shelter promoters). The only benefit here is in removing
the opinion-writing function from the lawyer doing the deal. A much
cleaner way to do that, though, is the strict liability approach discussed
above. 89
5. Disclosing the Opinion as a Condition of Penalty Protection
The race to the bottom among opinion writers is a very difficult
problem, then, and it does not become easier in requiring a separate
opinion counsel to write it. But there is a worthwhile measure that
should be implemented-and, thus far, the government has done so
only partially: The government should say that an opinion cannot
help to provide penalty protection unless it is attached to the tax
return.90
Instead of requiring disclosure of the opinion itself, the government
has begun requiring disclosure about the transaction as a condition for
penalty protection in some cases. Specifically, if the transaction is oth-
erwise "reportable," 91 the reasonable cause exception is not available
if the transaction was not disclosed. 92 This is a step in the right direc-
tion, since the opinion cannot offer penalty protection if the taxpayer
tries to hide the transaction.
It would be even better, though, to require disclosure of the opinion
itself. Under the revised Circular 230, the opinion has to lay out the
issues presented in the transaction, serving, in a sense, as a roadmap
for the government to challenge the transaction.93 This step would
89 See Subsection IV.B.1.
90 Michael Schler suggested this idea over three years ago. See Michael L. Schler, Ten
More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Profes-
sor Weisbach, 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 371-72 (2002).
91 See note 82.
92 The government originally introduced this rule administratively, and then confirmed
its authority to do so in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§ 811, 118 Stat. 1418, 1579. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (failure to disclose reportable transaction was a
"strong indication that the taxpayer did not act in good faith" for purposes of accuracy
related penalty); see IRC § 6664(d)(2)(A) (eliminating reasonable cause for undisclosed
transactions and thus subjecting taxpayers who fail to disclose reportable transaction to a
30% penalty).
93 Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(i) (2004).
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significantly reduce the government's costs in analyzing the transac-
tion, and also would deter aggressive planning, since taxpayers would
have to expose the transaction's vulnerabilities in order to secure pen-
alty protection. 94 Of course, taxpayers may be concerned that rogue
auditors will misuse the opinion, and some procedural mechanism,
such as input from a centralized office like the Office of Tax Shelter
Analysis, is needed to address this concern. But however the opinion
is used by the government, it is much less valuable to the taxpayer if it
is not persuasive: Even if the opinion protects the taxpayer from pen-
alties, it makes them more likely to have to pay the underlying tax. If
an opinion must be turned over in this way, taxpayers will be less sat-
isfied with a document that offers an overly optimistic bottom line.
Rather, the taxpayer will want to be sure the opinion is right, and that
the transaction actually works. As with the strict liability regime dis-
cussed above, this approach creates exactly the right incentive for the
private bar. They will be asked to give honest advice about how to
comply with the law.
Given these useful effects, this requirement should be imposed not
just for reportable transactions-an imperfect category, as noted be-
low-but for any transaction for which the taxpayer wants penalty
protection. This is critical, since a substantial volume of shelters are
not reportable transactions, but are simply deals that have no business
purpose or economic substance.
V. ENLISTING THE PRIVATE BAR: DRIVE A WEDGE
BETWEEN THE LAWYER AND CLIENT
In considering ways to enlist the tax bar's help for the government,
the prior Part focused on tasks that, at least to an extent, would be in
the client's interest. This Part, in contrast, considers ways to pressure
the private bar for help, even if giving this help is not in their clients'
interest. In a sense, the goal here is to detach the lawyer from the
client, something that is very hard to do. As a result, the initiatives in
this Part are generally less promising than those in the prior Part, al-
though some are more appealing than others.
A. Sanctions
Given that lawyers are strongly predisposed to pursue client inter-
ests, the government will have to create a powerful counterweight to
94 In serving as a source of information for the government, which then could use this
information in reevaluating existing law, this proposal is a variation of the "new govern-
ance" or "experimentalist" approach to regulation developed by colleagues at Columbia.
For a discussion, see notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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distract them from this mission. One obvious reason for a lawyer to
favor the government over client interests is self-interest, and, in par-
ticular, fear of various penalties. For example, the government re-
cently indicted a tax lawyer for aiding and abetting tax fraud in
connection with KPMG's tax shelter business.95 Circular 230 contains
new penalties as well.96 There also have been a number of malprac-
tice actions brought against lawyers who gave favorable opinions in
shelter cases. 97 In theory, the government could create a similar sys-
tem in which it looks to lawyers to bear a portion of the understate-
ment penalty imposed when a deal they blessed is successfully
challenged.
Obviously, though, such sanctions are only effective if lawyers actu-
ally expect to be punished. A malpractice judgment is embarrassing,
but there are a range of reasons why malpractice claims are unlikely
to succeed in this context, including the proliferation of arbitration
clauses.98 Criminal indictments are an even more powerful disciplin-
ing device. However badly a client may want a result, lawyers will not
go along if they believe they are risking their professional licenses,
their solvency, and even their freedom.99 On the other hand, if people
think that such indictments are a fluke, they are not effective. Like-
wise, some who are at risk of being indicted may not realize it, since,
human nature being what it is, people sometimes deceive themselves
into believing their bad behavior is justifiable. An unfortunate conse-
quence of this sort of sanction is that risk-tolerant lawyers will have an
advantage over risk-averse ones, since some number of risk-tolerant
lawyers will push the line without being caught.
Another risk with sanctioning the lawyer is to make sure that such
sanctions do not create bad incentives for the client. The obvious ex-
ample is malpractice. Clients will be more likely to engage in shelters
if they believe they can pass on their penalties or other costs to their
advisors.100
95 See Lynnley Browning, I.R.S Offers Deal to Firms Promoting Tax Shelters, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 2006, at Cl.
96 Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.52 (2004).
97 See, e.g., Koppel, note 57, at Cl.
98 If the government wants malpractice to be a more effective sanction, they can dis-
courage the use of arbitration clauses (for example, by saying that a tax opinion cannot
provide penalty protection if the lawyer and client are bound by an arbitration clause). I
thank Bill Simon for this observation.
99 Correspondingly, offers not to prosecute sometimes can induce cooperation. The
government has tried this tack with promoters, so far with mixed results. See Browning,
note 95, at Cl (noting that the government has offered to spare promoters from prosecu-
tion if promoters pay penalties and turn over information, but that some promoters are
unlikely to accept the deal).
100 The question becomes more complicated if malpractice insurance covers these judg-
ments, and lawyers are able to pass the cost of insurance on to clients in the form of higher
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B. Disclosure
In a truly unusual development, Congress recently has required tax
advisors to keep lists of clients who engage in tax shelters, which they
must turn over to the government upon request, and also to disclose
the details of these deals in some cases. 101 (A parallel disclosure re-
gime also has been imposed on clients).10 2
At first blush, it is easy to see why the government wishes to try
this. Tax advisors have much more information than the government
about what taxpayers actually are doing. By gathering this informa-
tion, the government hopes to fashion more effective rules, closing
loopholes and shutting down abusive practices.1 03 Indeed, this regime
seems, at first glance, to be an intriguing example of what colleagues
at Columbia call "experimentalism" or "new governance. 1 104 The es-
sence of this approach is for the decisionmaker to gather information,
propose tentative rules, gather further information to see whether
these rules are effective, and revise the rules. 10 5 Under this view,
good governance depends on rolling standards and constant efforts to
gather information.10 6
Yet as one looks more closely at this disclosure initiative, it inspires
less confidence. In assigning the tax bar this function, the government
offers only sticks, without carrots. Failure to comply carries penalties,
to be sure, but faithful and meaningful compliance carries no discern-
able reward. Most notably, the lawyer is not advancing client interests
in providing this disclosure. Quite the contrary, the lawyer in effect is
being asked to "rat" on the client. Unlike in the case of writing opin-
ions, where the lawyer is providing something of value to the client,
the bar here is being drafted to work for the government, and the
government alone.
Not surprisingly, then, the tax bar is highly motivated to undermine
the effectiveness of this effort. The goal is to be able to say they are
complying, but without providing truly helpful information. Taxpay-
rates. For instance, the end result may be that conservative clients subsidize aggressive
ones (assuming the lawyer does not charge sufficiently different rates for standard and
overly aggressive advice).
101 See IRC §§ 6111, 6112(b), 6707, 6708.
102 See IRC §§ 6011, 6707A.
103 House Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong., Supplemental Report of the Commit-
tee on Ways & Means on H.R. 4170, at 1025, 1351 (Comm. Print 1984).
104 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 314 (1998).
105 Id. at 314-16.
106 Indeed, this pattern is familiar to tax lawyers, since most new rules-whether statutes
or regulations-initially are proposed in draft, and then are revised in response to com-
ments. Likewise, informal authorities such as revenue rulings sometimes are revoked or
superseded in response to new information or changed circumstances.
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ers and their advisors use aggressive readings of the relevant "filters"
to conclude that they do not have to disclose some shelters. At the
same time, the bar also reads the filters fastidiously to conclude that
they must disclose transactions that are not at all objectionable. In
some cases, this is an excess of caution, since the filters are vague, and
there is little to be lost, from the client's perspective, in disclosing
these deals. But there is also a bit of gamesmanship at work here. By
flooding the government with paper, lawyers make it all the more dif-
ficult for the government to find the truly useful disclosure. There is
no penalty, after all, for adding hay to the haystack, in order to make
the needle harder to find. Time will tell, of course, just how useful this
initiative proves to be for the government. But to my mind, it is a
questionable use of scarce resources and political capital.
C. Patriotism and Professional Duty to the System
Instead of relying on the bar's fear of sanctions, the government
could try appealing to their professional pride and patriotism. Al-
though there is no consensus on the point, many commentators be-
lieve that tax lawyers owe a duty not just to their clients, but also to
the system.10 7 One formulation, advanced by Bill Simon, is that the
tax system gives tax lawyers their livelihood, so they in turn owe a
duty to nurture it.108 My own view relies less on this narrow reciproc-
ity, and more on the gratitude that any citizen should feel for the free-
dom and security the U.S. government provides; if we feel grateful, we
should want to preserve the government's lifeline, the tax system.
Perhaps in some cases, this sort of altruistic motive will guide tax
advisors-after all, life is about more than billing hours. But it is na-
ive to rely too heavily on these motives. For one thing, some take a
different view of their patriotic duty, focusing on the fact that the gov-
ernment wastes money, and that the Service's agents can be petty ty-
rants. Under this view, it is a patriotic contribution to keep resources
in the more dynamic private sector and to protect clients from bureau-
cratic bullies.
In any event, however a tax lawyer views our tax system, she is un-
likely to be guided by sentiment alone, or by a professional duty that
is unenforceable. Richard Lavoie urges legal academics to use their
107 See, e.g., Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor-A Perspective,
40 Taxes 1030, 1032 (1962) (arguing that tax advisors have a duty to see that the tax system
is meeting the needs of the government); Randolph E. Paul, The Responsibilities of the
Tax Adviser, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 386 (1950) (arguing that the tax advisor has a supple-
mentary duty to the tax system in her capacity as a citizen with special qualifications in one
of the most important areas of public interest).
108 William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibility
of the Business Lawyer, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1453 (2007).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 59:
ENLISTING THE TAX BAR
bully pulpits, inculcating students with a sense of their professional
duty to the system, so that they will be faithful to this imperative after
they graduate. 10 9 I certainly favor an emphasis on professional re-
sponsibility in the tax curriculum-indeed, in the entire law school
curriculum-but I do not think we should overstate the staying power
of these lessons.
Advisors are most likely to follow their better angels when they are
in an institutional setting that frees them to do so. Indeed, the goal of
this Article is to identify the most promising settings-for instance,
when they serve in government, when they participate in bar associa-
tion activities, or, of course, when their clients' interests point in this
direction. But outside of these safe settings, the patriotism of tax law-
yers generally is too slender a reed to support cooperation with the
government.
VI. CONCLUSION
The mismatch between the government and the private bar contrib-
utes significantly to tax shelters and to the inefficiency and inequity
that aggressive planning brings to our system. This Article has offered
two reasons why the mismatch is so hard to remedy. First, it is politi-
cally difficult to fund a truly robust public infrastructure for tax ad-
ministration. Second, the private bar does not have incentive to pick
up the slack; on the contrary, their clients ordinarily view tax adminis-
trators as the enemy, and thus do not want the bar to be of help.
An important challenge, then, is to identify contexts in which the
client and the government have common interests, so that the tax law-
yer can "do good and do well" at the same time. These contexts are
few and far between, but they do exist, and this Article has empha-
sized some that have not received sufficient attention. There are
times, also, when a lawyer's loyalties can be detached from the inter-
ests of private clients, if the carrot or stick applied directly to them is
strong enough.
At the end of the day, though, the private bar can serve only a lim-
ited function. Raising the quality of the government's efforts is vital.
This Article has offered a range of steps that should not attract too
much political opposition. Any opposition that does arise should be
resisted strenuously, because there truly is no substitute for competent
tax administration. Starving this infrastructure is a poor way to cut
taxes, as this path encourages wasteful planning, benefits aggressive
taxpayers more than conservative ones, and ultimately breeds disre-
spect for the law. It would be far wiser to cut rates. Indeed, if we
109 Lavoie, note 5, at 90-91.
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paired rate cuts with more robust investments in tax administration,
and thus more effective efforts to curtail aggressive planning, we
might well find a revenue neutral path to a more efficient and equita-
ble tax system.
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